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Abstract We consider a two-country model of price competition, with one polluting firm1
in each country and differentiated products. Assuming away, to simplify, abatement efforts2
and input substitution, we compare the impact on output, leakages, and trade volumes of3
a carbon tax versus an emission standard policy, unilaterally enacted by the home country.4
Under the tax the two firms set their prices simultaneously, in a Bertrand game. Under the 15
standard the home firm’s price is conditioned on the price of the foreign firm, so as to abide6
the emission constraint. As a result, the tax leads to higher leakages and global emissions7
than the standard. The standard also implies a better trade balance for the home country than8
the tax.9
Keywords Carbon leakage · Carbon tax · Emission standards · Trade balance · Price10
competition11
1 Introduction12
Efforts by industrialized countries to reduce polluting emissions have been accompanied by13
concerns over the effectiveness of unilateral measures, in terms of both welfare loss and14
carbon leakages. It is in fact well established in the literature that measures targeting a subset
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of manufacturers within a country (Fowlie 2009; Holland 2012)1 or manufacturers in only15
a subset of countries (incomplete regulation) can induce production and emission leakages16
to unregulated firms and in other countries (Paltsev 2001), or they can encourage domestic17
firms to relocate plants (Babiker 2005). The high variability of “leakages” rates reported in18
the literature (see, for references, Barker et al. 2007; Baylis et al. 2014; Sanna-Randaccio19
et al. 2014) makes the debate still lively. Hence, considerable attention has been devoted20
to the analysis of these mechanisms—several contributions also analyzing countervailing21
measures, like border tax adjustments or upstream-downstream subsidies (Fischer and Fox22
2012; Fischer et al. 2012).23
A related question is which type of policy minimizes leakages. For instance, intensity24
standards, that set limits to carbon emissions per unit of output, have been proved to be25
inefficient (Fischer 2001; Holland et al. 2009), since “they cannot attain the first best, could26
increase carbon emissions”, and entail “much higher abatement costs than an efficient policy”27
(see Holland et al. 2009, p. 1). Still, according to Holland (2012), intensity standards can28
be welfare superior to a carbon tax and allow for a second best outcome, in the presence of29
incomplete regulation and leakages.30
So far, most of the existing literature on carbon leakages arising from local or incomplete31
regulation focuses on perfectly competitive markets. However, most issues in environmental32
regulation have beenwidely analyzed also in the context of oligopolistic industries [Arora and33
Gangopadhyay (1995), Amacher et al. (2004), and Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero34
(2002) are concerned with environmental qualities in a duopoly; Toshimitsu (2008), Kurtyka35
and Mahenc (2011), and Carlsson (2000) deal with environmental taxation in duopolies;36
Lahiri and Ono (2007) compare welfare under permits and taxes; Requate (2006) provides a37
summary view]. Furthermore, as argued by Fowlie (2009), “The majority of emissions that38
are currently subject to regional, market-based regulations come from industries that are often39
characterized as imperfectly competitive (important examples include restructured electricity40
markets and cement)” (see Fowlie 2009, p. 73). Finally, Ryan (2012) and Fowlie et al.41
(2012) supply evidence that concentrated industries are crucially affected by environmental42
regulation; using data for the U.S. Portland cement industry, the first provides an assessment43
of welfare reductions and increase in sunk costs, and the second of the welfare losses and44
“leakages” from incomplete regulation.45
Based on these considerations, in this paper we analyze the implementation of an environ-46
mental policy under imperfect competition in prices, and its consequences in terms of both47
carbon leakages and trade only, thus neglecting the welfare effects. In the baseline version of48
the model, we assume that firms cannot price discriminate across countries. This assumption49
may fit the case where leakages occur within the same country due to incomplete regulation,50
while also serving as a first approximation for a two country model. In the second version of51
the model, we allow firms to price discriminate across countries. On top of deriving carbon52
leakages, we also consider the effects on the international competitiveness of the regulated53
country, by assessing the impact on its trade balance.54
1
“For political, jurisdictional and technical reasons, environmental regulation of industrial pollution is often
incomplete: rules apply to only a subset of the sources contributing to a pollution problem. When some
firms in a polluting industry are subject to market-based environmental regulation (such as a pollution tax or
pollution permit trading program) while others are exempt, the production costs of regulated producers will
increase relative to their unregulated rivals. If unregulated production can be easily substituted for production
at regulated firms, emissions reductions achieved by regulated producers may be substantially offset, or even
eliminated, by increases in emissions among unregulated producers.” (See Fowlie 2009, p. 72).
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We compare the effects of two alternative instruments, a carbon tax and an emission55
standard; the latter is defined as the maximum quantity of emissions by the regulated firm.256
Both policies come as exogenous shocks to the firm in the regulated country. Nonetheless, to57
enable meaningful comparisons, the policy instruments that the regulator can introduce are58
tailored so as to guarantee the same level of emissions in the home country. Hence, the tax59
level set by the Regulator is such that an “equivalent tax” is achieved. We do not consider60
abatement efforts and focus instead on the effects generated by strategic interaction in price61
competition. Although we think that abatement would also be affected, the focus on pricing62
strategies allows to reveal a channel of “transmission” of policies that per se is sufficient to63
bring forth leakage effects. Since firms are assumed to be immobile,3 leakages arise due to64
a shift in production and trade patterns, and not from firms’ relocation abroad (see instead65
Petrakis and Xepapadeas 2003; Sanna-Randaccio et al. 2014).66
The key assumptionwemake is that under a tax policy firms set their prices simultaneously,67
while under a standard the twofirmsmove in a Stackelberg-type sequencewith the (regulated)68
home firm moving only after having observed the price set by the foreign competitor. The69
assumption and the modeling strategy are explained and justified as follows. An emission70
standard implies a cap on the home firm’s output, since we analyze a short-run without71
abatement efforts, with firms being unable to reduce their emissions per unit of output ratio.72
This assumption is justifiable in a short run analysis where fixed factors cannot be changed73
and/or new technologies cannot be made available without discontinuous changes in costs,74
that make them unprofitable, or without investments in R&D that take time to deliver their75
results. Sunk abatement costsmay also play a role in deterring abatement efforts as recognized76
by Pindyck (2007) (see also Saltari and Travaglini (2011) and the references therein).4 It77
follows that the regulated firm (firm 1) must exclude from its possible responses all the prices78
that do not satisfy the constraint; in this way the action set of firm 1 becomes a function of79
the price chosen by the rival—and of the emission cap. More simply, the set of admissible80
prices for firm 1 under a standard contains all prices larger or equal to a minimum price which81
depends upon the rival’s price and upon the emission standard.82
A first consequence of this dependence is that a simultaneous representation of the game83
is in contrast with the need to have firm 1 informed5 about which values for its price are84
“legal” for a given price of the rival— since values for the home firm price are not per se85
illegal but only in relation to the rival’s price. A second consequence of this dependence is86
2 Since regulation is exogenously implemented in one country only, there is no trade in permits. Hence,
emission standards and tradable permits are equivalent policy instruments in our context. If there were two
regulated firms in the home country trade in permits would enable these firms to reallocate emission quotas but
the final outcome, that the total production in the home country remain fixed would not be altered. Assuming
permits are granted in equal amounts to each firm, trade in permits would not occur in a model where home
firms are identical; the algebra for this model is more complicated but our results are confirmed.
3 As in the short run or due to technological constraints.
4 We do not claim that abatement possibilities are irrelevant. The inclusion of abatement efforts that make
the unit emission level β a function of abatement expenditures, k, say, may offset some of the results, but
only if a tax induces larger abatement by firm 1 than a standard (firm 2 does not need to abate). Even in that
case, the total impact on the production of the unregulated firm (leakages) would depend crucially upon the
amount of abatement induced on firm 1 and hence finally on the parameters shaping the marginal abatement
cost function. Low marginal abatement costs may reverse the results if a tax induces higher abatement than a
standard; high abatement costs will not reverse the results.
5 In any representation of a game in extensive form the player that must move at a given information set must
have the same set of available actions in any of the nodes contained in that information set (Mas-Colell et al.
1995; Kuhn 1953). If a player had different choices available at different nodes in an information set than he
could infer from the available choices the node at which he is called to play, and the nodes cannot belong then
to the same set.
123
Journal: 10640-EARE Article No.: 0234 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2018/3/6 Pages: 24 Layout: Small
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
un
co
rr
ec
te
d p
ro
of
P. G. Garella, M. T. Trentinaglia
that the usual way to check whether a pair of prices is a Nash equilibrium is invalidated. To be87
precise, starting from any candidate equilibrium price pair, the unregulated firm (firm 2) will88
recognize that it may become impossible for firm 1 to stick to the candidate equilibrium price.89
A deviation by firm 2 will then forcibly lead to a change in the price set by firm 1 as well. The90
feature that the strategy space of a player depends upon the choice of strategymade by another91
player is anomalous in simultaneous games, while it is quite common in sequential games.92
These considerations explain why the modeling adopted here for the emission standard takes93
the form of a sequential game and leads to a solution with the Stackelberg character.94
The effect of a carbon tax, by contrast, is simply to increase the marginal cost of the home95
firm, shifting upwards its reaction function (Anderson et al. 2001). We insist that a tax does96
not preclude any pair of prices as a possible solution; any positive price is always admissible97
for firm 1 and therefore there is no need to have firm 1 being informed about the rival’s98
choice.99
The comparison of prices under the two policies reveals that under a an emission standard,100
both firms set higher prices than under an equivalent tax. This is essentially due to the role101
played by firm 2 in setting its own price, exploiting the constraint imposed on firm 1. Indeed,102
if firms are assumed to move simultaneously, as discussed later in Sect. 2.4, the two policies103
lead to the same price vector and quantities. This is because the tax level is computed so as to104
lead to the same equilibrium quantity for firm 1—determined by the policy-maker choice—105
as under the standard; then, this quantity equivalence in a simultaneous game can only be106
granted by a shift of the best reply of firm 1 (under a tax this is just an ordinary linear best107
reply) till the crossing of the two best replies occurs at the same equilibrium price vector.108
Therefore, the forced price adjustment to the constraint by the home firm and the induced109
change in the behavior of the foreign firm, absent in the simultaneous game, are the key110
elements driving the results.111
We confirm the existing concerns over unilateral environmental regulation in the case of112
a carbon tax (see Paltsev 2001; Holland 2012), which indeed induces an unwanted increase113
in emissions by unregulated countries. We observe that an emission standard policy can even114
reduce emissions abroad, although this negative carbon leakage can occur only for very large115
targeted emission reductions. At any rate, the general message is that an emission standard116
leads to less leakage than a carbon tax.117
We then assess the inferiority of the carbon tax also with respect to the trade balance:118
because of the larger leakage, a carbon tax has negative effects on the home country trade119
balance, whereas the emission standard may ultimately improve it (or induce lower negative120
effects than a carbon tax). Overall, our findings point to the superiority of an emission standard121
over a carbon tax.122
Our findings depart from Holland (2012), where the inferiority of a standard stems from123
the firms changing their input compositions, choosing different emission levels in their cost124
minimization problem.6 In an extension of the baselinemodel,we briefly analyze the outcome125
of a game where firms choose their prices simultaneously under a standard. In this setting,126
the solution is given by the intersection point of the unregulated firm best reply function and127
the constrained price of the home firm. We observe that the emissions, and hence the carbon128
leakage, of firm 2 are the same as under a carbon tax. Hence our results suggest that, if a129
simultaneous game were deemed plausible, the regulator may be indifferent between the two130
alternative policy instruments.131
6 In our framework instead, input composition is fixed and the relative superiority of emission standards is
intrinsic to the strategic interaction occurring between the firms in the two countries.
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This work is structured as follows: Sect. 2 sets up the general model and analyzes the132
simplified case of a globally integrated demandwith no price discrimination; Sect. 3 develops133
the full discrimination case as well as the trade balance analysis; last, Sect. 4 draws the main134
conclusions. “Appendix I” summarizes and compares the equilibria obtained and discussed135
throughout Sect. 2; “Appendix II” contains some algebra for the price discrimination model;136
in “Appendix III”, we consider the effect of environmental regulation on the trade values of137
the regulated country.138
2 The Model139
2.1 The General Model140
Weassume that there is only onefirm in the homecountryHandonefirm in the foreign country141
F, both in a polluting industrial sector. Alternatively, we may also think of these two firms as142
being located in the samecountry but being subject to twodifferent environmental regulations:143
one firm may in fact belong to a regulated sector, and the other to an unregulated industry144
producing a substitute product. In our baseline setting, we rule out price discrimination,145
whereas in the international two countrymodel analyzed in Sect. 3, firms do price discriminate146
across countries.147
The government in country H decides to reduce domestically produced emissions to a148
given level, s, below the current level achieved under an unrestricted market equilibrium.149
The government in country H can use one of two policies: either introduce a carbon tax150
te, on each unit of pollutant, or target an overall emission level, assumed to be exogenous.151
Similarly, the firm in country F, or in the “other sector”, could be subject to an exogenous152
“carbon” tax (see Baylis et al. 2014), without substantially affecting our results.7153
The quantity of emissions per unit of production by the domestic firm isβ, with 0 < β ≤ 1,154
while that of the foreign firm is set equal to 1, in order to simplify exposition and without155
loss of generality. The domestic firm is denoted as firm 1 and the foreign firm as firm 2.156
Production costs are Ci (qi ) = ci qi for i = 1, 2.157
The firms’ products are differentiated and firms behave as Bertrand competitors. Product158
differentiation is reflected by γ ∈ (0, 1), with γ = 0 for independent goods (no perfect159
substitution is allowed, namely γ = 1 is ruled out). We have normalized to 1 the parameter160
for the ownprice in the demand function of good i , thereforewe impose the realistic restriction161
γ < 1, namely that the own price effect on demand is greater in size than the cross effect of162
a change in the price of the rival good.8 The direct demand functions in country H and F for163
7 In Holland (2012), firms can instead choose the level of emissions e, a costless input, together with another
costly input, so as to minimize their cost function.
8 Our approach is akin to Hackner (2000), where a utility function of the type as in Singh and Vives (1984),
U (q1, q2) = α1q1 + α2q2 − (1/2)(β1q21 + β2q
2
2 + 2γ q1q2) is rewritten with the restriction βi = 1. In
U (q1, q2), if γ = β1 = β2 (in Hackner (2000), if γ = 1), the two goods are perfect substitutes—as utility only
depends upon the sum q1+q2. First order conditions then give indirect demand functions pi = αi −qi −γ q j ,
for i, j = 1, 2. The corresponding direct demand system preserves symmetry in the cross effect (cross price
elasticities are identical) and is of the form: qi = ai −bi pi +cp j , where in particular c = γ /(1−γ 2). In order
to simplify the algebra, we have rewritten the direct demand as qi = Ai − pi + γ p j . This is not a substantial
change however, and to see that our approach is as in Hackner (2000) consider U (q1, q2) with β1 = β2 = 1,
and transform it as V (q1, q2) = (1 − γ 2)−1U (q1, q2). Then V (q1, q2) and U (q1, q2) represent the same
preference ordering. Maximization of V (q1, q2) leads to the first order condition (1−γ 2)pi = αi −qi −γ q j ,
hence the demand system of our model obtains as qi = Ai − pi + γ p j , with Ai = α/(1 + γ ). As in the
standard approach, the two goods tend to be perfect substitutes if γ tends to 1.
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i = 1, 2 with i = j are, respectively:164
qhi
(
phi , p
h
j
)
= A + γ phj − p
h
i (1)165
q fi
(
p fi , p
f
j
)
= B + γ p fj − p
f
i (2)166167
where phi , p
f
i represent the prices quoted by firm i in country H and F respectively.168
A carbon tax is a unit tax on emissions. The only firm paying the tax under a tax policy is169
the home firm. The carbon tax implies an increase in the marginal cost of production for the170
home firm from c1to c1 + βt , given the exogenous emission rate β.171
The emission standard, by contrast, sets an implicit limit on production by the home firm:9172
if the level of allowed emissions is s, that is qβ = s, total production by the home firm cannot173
exceed the quantity s/β. Emissions above this floor imply a penalty, w. Hence, to avoid the174
emission penalty, firm 1 must choose the price pair (ph1 , p
f
1 ) that satisfies the following175
constraint:176
A + B + γ
(
ph2 + p
f
2
)
− ph1 − p
f
1 ≤ s/β. (3)177
For the remaining of the analysis we shall assume that the foreign country is not adopting178
any policy concerning emissions—or that firm 2 is not subject to regulation. Carbon leak is179
usually defined as the ratio between the changes in emissions, as in Fischer and Fox (2012).180
In our analysis, we instead compare two alternative policies that generate the same level of181
emissions by firm 1. In this framework, carbon leak would be the ratio between the changes182
in emissions by the two firms under these two scenarios (indexed by i).183
ei2∣∣ei1∣∣ .184
By definition the denominator is the same in either case. As such, our carbon leak measures185
essentially compares the changes in emissions byfirm2 under the two policy scenario, namely186
esim2,t and e
seq
2,s .187
2.2 The No Price Discrimination Model188
In the present sub-section, we shall analyze the case where each firm quotes the same price189
at home and abroad, although we do not rule out cost asymmetries. The general model in the190
next section allows firms to price discriminate across countries so that each firm chooses two191
prices, although in order to simplify we shall then impose symmetric costs.192
Since noprice discrimination is possible andno transportation cost exists, the two countries193
can be viewed as a single market with A = B = M , and total demand to firm 1 and 2 can194
be defined as qi (pi , p j ) = 2(M + γ p j − pi ), for i = 1, 2, i = j . In order to simplify the195
exposition, and since profit maximization is not affected, we rescale demand and write it as10196
qi (pi , p j ) = M + γ p j − pi , for i = 1, 2, i = j.197
9 Our emission standard policy differs from an intensity standard policy, as the regulation target is the total
level of emissions s rather the unitary polluting content β.
10 Rescaling demand is neutral as long as profit functions are rescaled, too. Here, instead, only revenues
are rescaled. Still, this has no consequences on our results as quantities, marginal costs and tax rates are not
directly compared across specifications of our model.
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The cost functions are Ci (qi ) = ci qi , for i = 1, 2 and with ci < M . The best reply functions198
in the game where no policies are adopted by either country are199
pi = (1/2)
(
M + ci + γ p j
)
for i, j = 1, 2. (4)200
The Nash equilibrium prices are easily derived as:201
p∗i = [M(2+ γ )+ 2ci + γ c j ]/(4− γ
2) , for i = j, and i, j = 1, 2. (5)202
Total quantities produced by each firm in the unregulated equilibrium are203
q∗i =
[(
M(2+ γ )− ci (2− γ 2)+ γ c j
)]
/
(
4− γ 2
)
. (6)204
so that total quantity, Q∗ = q∗1 + q∗2 =
[
2M − (c1 + c2) (1− γ )
]
/(2− γ ).205
Finally, the equilibrium profits are π∗1 =
(
q∗1
)2
and π∗2 =
(
q∗2
)2
.206
2.2.1 Emission Standards207
Assume that the Government in the Home country sets an emission standard such that βq1 <208
θ , where θ is the desired emission level. Then we assume that, after the standard has been209
fixed, the price game unfolds in two stages. At stage 1 the unregulated firm 2 sets its price; at210
stage 2 firm 1, having observed firm 2’s choice, also sets its price. This game is the simplest211
structure that allows the change we have in mind and this is the one we retain.212
Solving backward, one can consider the second stage where firm 2 has set a price p2 at213
the first stage. Then, the best reply by firm 1 is the best price in the set P(p2; θ) of p1 values214
satisfying the constraint. Given the information provided by the first price, the constraint215
forces firm 1 to set a price high enough so that demand for its product satisfies the constraint216
βq1(p1, p2) ≤ s or β(M + γ p2 − p1) ≤ s. This can be rewritten as p1 ≥ M + γ p2 − θ ,217
where θ ≡ s/β is a convenient notation for the regulated output. As part of the policy one218
can assume that an output exceeding s/β can only be produced with the additional cost of a219
penalty on emissions. We shall assume this penalty to be high enough to make it worthwhile220
for the firm to respect the target at equilibrium—otherwise the policy design would fail. The221
level of s (or of θ ) here must be such that θ < q∗1 where q∗1 is defined by (6) and corresponds222
to optimal output under no regulation. The penaltyw is assumed to be a function of emissions223
in excess of s, namely w(e) = k + ω(e − s), where k > 0 is a fixed part of the penalty and224
e = βq1. Let the function Bu(p2) = (M + c1 + γ p2)(1/2) denote the unconstrained best225
reply for firm1when no policy is implemented. Bu(p2) is a linear function of p2.11 Therefore,226
the profit maximization program for firm 1 respecting the emission target is modified as227
max
p1
(p1 − c1) (M + γ p2 − p1) s.t. M + γ p2 − p1 ≤ θ (7)228
The maximization program if the firm exceeds the constraint is229
max
p1
(p1 − c1)θ + (p1 − c1 − ω)q(p1, p2, θ)− k230
where the function q(.) is defined as q(θ, p2, p1) = max[(M + γ p2 − p1 − θ), 0].231
The best reply for firm 1 when it violates the constraint and pays the penalty lies along the232
best reply of firm 1 under a simple tax on emissions, given by B(p2, ω) = Bu(p2)+(βω) /2,233
11 If the exogenous level of emissions s is such that M − (s/β) < (1/2)(M + c1), or M − c1 < 2θ , then the
constraint expressed as the function p1 = C(p2) ≡ M +γ p2− θ crosses from below the function Bu(p2), at
the value p¯2 = (2θ − M + c1) /γ . Otherwise, if M − c1 > 2θ , the constraint lies above the function Bu(p2)
for all p2 > 0, but the algebra would not be altered.
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Fig. 1 Constrained optimization
where the tax rate would be ω. The constraint crosses this line at the point with horizontal234
coordinate ¯¯p2 ≡ (2θ − M + c1 + βω) /γ . However, firm 1 will adopt this reply function235
only for a price by firm 2 above ¯¯p2 as it shall be clarified shortly.236
Hence the best reply for firm 1, considering also the constrained part, is237
C B(p2) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Bu(p2) = (1/2)(M + c1)+ (γ /2)p2 for 0 ≤ p2 ≤ p¯2
C(p2) = M + γ p2 − θ for p¯2 < p2 < ¯¯p2 + η
B(p2, ω) = (1/2)(M + c1 + βω)+ (γ /2)p2 for ¯¯p2 + η < p2.
(8)238
The functions Bu(p2), B(p2, ω) and the constraint C(p2) are represented in Fig. 1 below,239
for the case where M − c1 < 2θ , where in the graph, T = M − θ . The constrained best240
reply C B(p2) is a piecewise linear function represented as the thick line with a kink at the241
point p¯2 and a discontinuity at the point ¯¯p2 + η.12 The admissible values for p1 satisfying242
the constraint depend upon the policy measure, θ , and upon p2. The idea here is that firm 1,243
when its unconstrained best reply, B(p1), leads to a penalty for over-emissions, will choose244
p1 so as to satisfy the constraint exactly.245
We shall assume that the constraint be binding, least the policy would fail its objective in246
terms of emissions in the home country. Firm 2 acts, de facto, as a Stackelberg leader choosing247
p2 knowing that p1 shall be set so as to satisfy the constraint.Hence themaximization problem248
for firm 2 is249
max
p2
(p2 − c2) (M + γ (M + γ p2 − θ)− p2) .250
The profit maximizing price for 2 is251
pˆ2 =
[
M(1+ γ )− θγ + c2(1− γ 2)
]
/(2− 2γ 2)252
12 Firm 1 does not switch to the best reply B(p1) + βω/2 for a price p2 = ¯¯p2 because of the fixed part in
the penalty, k. It would do so only if k was equal to zero.
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and p1 is determined by the constraint as p1 = M + γ pˆ2 − θ or253
pˆ1 =
M(2+ γ − γ 2)− θ(2− γ 2)+ γ c2(1− γ 2)
2(1− γ 2)
.254
Under the standard, equilibrium production by firm 2 is given by255
qseq2,s = (1/2)[M(1+ γ )− c2(1− γ
2)− γ θ ]256
where it is useful to take note that −qseq2,s /dθ = γ /2. Obviously, setting θ = 0 in q
seq
2,s257
does not give the unregulated equilibrium quantity as the quantity qseq2,s is computed using a258
Stackelberg solution. Total production is Qseqs = qseq1,s + qseq2,s = θ + qseq2,s , or259
Qseqs = (1/2)[M(1+ γ )+ θ(2− γ )− c2(1− γ 2)].260
The quantity (and emissions) produced in country F increases by the amount eseq2,s =261
qseq2,s − q
∗
2 , where q
∗
2 is given by Eq. (6).262
Therefore, the change in emissions in country 2 is263
e
seq
2,s = γ
M(1− γ )
2(2− γ )
+ γ
γ c2(3− γ 2)− 2c1
2(4− γ 2)
−
θγ
2
, (9)264
for γ tending to zeroeseq2,s goes to zero. Further, one can show that for reasonable differences265
in marginal costs, the change in production and hence in emissions by firm 2 is negative for266
a wide range of values for s and therefore for θ : a negative leakage implies that policy in267
country H has a positive spillover in terms of global emission reduction. For instance, set268
c1 = c2 = 0; recalling then that the unregulated output for the home firm is q∗1 = M/(2−γ ),269
Eq. (9) implieseseq2,s ≥ 0 only if M(2− γ ) > θ(1− γ ) or θ/q∗1 ≤ (1− γ ). Since θ = s/β270
is the domestic firm output level that satisfies the emission standard exactly, this condition is271
easily violated. Therefore, an emission standard is unlikely to lead to leakages in our model;272
in particular leakages occur only if the emission reduction required is relatively small and273
the substitutability parameter, γ , is low or γ ≤ 1 − θ/q∗1 .13 These considerations shall be274
summarized after a comparison with a tax policy is completed.275
We shall compare the change in emissions under a standard with the carbon leak obtained276
under the carbon tax—levied only on firm 1—which provides an emission reduction exactly277
equal to a given standard policy s.278
2.2.2 Competition Under a Carbon Tax279
We shall now assume that on each unit of emission produced by firm 1 the government in280
country H levies a tax equal to te, so that the marginal cost of firm 1 raises to βte. No other281
restriction is imposed. The profit maximization program for firm 1 results in the best reply282
function given in (8), where c1 must be replaced by c1t ≡ c1 + βte. The equilibrium prices283
and quantities can be easily derived by appropriately rewriting the solutions in (5) and the284
following equations. Letting t ≡ βte, the equilibrium quantity by firm 1 in particular is given285
as a function of t , qsim1,t =
[
M(2+ γ )− c1t (2− γ 2)+ γ c2
]
(4 − γ 2)−1. It is sufficient to286
13 To relate the inequality to real world policy considerations, consider a 10% reduction in the domestic
firm output: namely consider θ ≤ 0.9q∗1 , where θ = q
seq
1,s is implied by the desired level of emissions; then
e
seq
2,s ≥ 0 only if γ ≤ 0.1, that is, only if substitutability is extremely low.
123
Journal: 10640-EARE Article No.: 0234 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2018/3/6 Pages: 24 Layout: Small
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
un
co
rr
ec
te
d p
ro
of
P. G. Garella, M. T. Trentinaglia
set this quantity equal to s/β in order to find t (s), the tax that brings forth an equilibrium287
quantity of emissions equal to s. The solution is the “equivalent carbon tax”:288
tˆ = teβ =
M(2+ γ )
(2− γ 2)
+
(
γ c2 − θ(4− γ 2)
)
(
2− γ 2
) − c1289
It is immediate to see that tˆ is a function of θ (namely of the desired emission target s),290
and it is positive as far as the limit on emissions is binding, namely as far as βqsim1,t > s291
(or equivalently qsim1,t > θ ). It is therefore straightforward to compute the Nash equilibrium,292
using (6), with c1 replaced by c1t = (c1+ tˆ).14 Since dqsim2,tˆ /dc1t = γ /(4−γ 2) one has that293
−
dqsim2,tˆ
dθ
= −
dq2(t)
dc1t
dtˆ
dθ
=
γ
2− γ 2
.294
An increase in the reduction q∗1 − θ (a reduction in θ) brings forth an increase in production295
abroad. Hence there is a leakage of emissions abroad whenever a reduction in emission is296
obtained through a carbon tax. Indeed,297
esim2,tˆ =
γ
(
M(γ + 2)− c1
(
2− γ 2
)
+ γ c2 − θ(4− γ 2)
)
γ 4 − 6γ 2 + 8
(10)298
which is always positive for all the admissible values of θ .299
Moreover, it is worth noting that the price of the unregulated firms when the standard300
is implemented in the regulated country is greater than the price of the underegulated firm301
whenever a carbon tax is introduced in the Home country, namely pseq2,s > p
sim
2,t .
15302
14 As expressed above, the quantity of firm 1 as a function of t (θ) is given by qsim1,t =[
M(2+ γ )− c1t (2− γ 2)+ γ c2
]
(4− γ 2)−1. Similarly, the quantity of firm 2 is
qsim2,t =
(
M(2+ γ )− c2(2− γ 2)+ γ c1t
)
(4− γ 2)−1
For t = tˆ , quantities are
qsim1,tˆ = θ q
sim
2,tˆ =
(
M(1+ γ )− γ θ − c2(1− γ 2)
)
(2− γ 2)−1.
and prices become
psim1,tˆ = (M(2+ γ − 2θ − γ c2))(2− γ
2)−1 qsim2,tˆ = (M(1+ γ − γ θ + c2))(2− γ
2)−1.
15 Recalling that pseq2,s =
M(1+ γ )− γ θ
2(1− γ 2)
and that psim2,t =
M(2+ γ )+ γ t
4− γ 2
, and assuming for simplicity
that c1 = c2 = 0, it is immediate to conclude that p
seq
2,s − p
sim
2,tˆ =
1
2
γ 2
M + Mγ − θγ
γ 4 − 3γ 2 + 2
> 0.
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2.2.3 Comparison of Policies303
By comparing the increase in production in the foreign country under the two regimes, from304
Eqs. (9) and (10), we can state that the carbon leak under a carbon tax is larger than under305
an emission standard.16306
Proposition 1 If price discrimination is not allowed (or firms sell in the same country), (i)307
a standard policy that reduces emissions by the regulated firm to a target level s entails a308
lower carbon leak than an equivalent carbon tax t. (ii) Further, an emission standard can309
lead to a reduction of pollution by the unregulated firm (negative leak); for instance, for310
equal marginal costs set to zero, this holds for any targeted emission level above 50% of the311
unregulated equilibrium emissions in the home country.312
The following Proof proves part (ii).313
Proof Theeseq2,s value in (9) is positive if
(
2− γ − γ 2
)
M + (3− γ 2)c2− 2c1− 4θ + θγ 2314
is positive. Letting θ = λM for 0 < λ < 1, the condition is
(
2− γ − γ 2 − 4λ+ λγ 2
)
M +315
(3 − γ 2)c2 − 2c1 > 0. For instance then, with c1 = c2 = 0 the expression is positive316
only if 2 − γ (1 + γ ) > λ(4 − γ 2). Hence if c1 = c2 = 0, the leak is negative if λ >317 [
2− γ (1+ γ )
]
/
(
4− γ 2
)
≡ λ′(γ ), and positive if λ < λ′(γ ), where it can be noted that318
λ′(γ ) is lower than 1/2 for all γ ≥ 0. ⊓⊔319
Hence, according to Proposition 1, a carbon tax makes the regulated firm less competitive320
in the usual sense; its best reply function in the Bertrand game shifts upward as if the firm321
had incurred a marginal cost increase. Its equilibrium output decreases while that of the322
foreign firm increases. By contrast, under an emission standard the regulated firm is made323
less competitive in a different way: it cannot use its price as it would like to do in a Bertrand324
simultaneous game, and it must instead use it as a tool to reduce its output in response to the325
price set by the competitor. In a sense the latter is then able to gain in value terms without a326
large increase in volumes in this second scenario.327
Remark 1 Aunilateral carbon tax can lead to an increase in global emissions.More precisely,328
if price discrimination is impossible, a reduction in emissions at home leads to higher global329
emissions if and only if β < γ/(2− γ 2).17330
16 With the difference in leakages under the two regimes amounting to
esim2,tˆ −e
seq
2,s =
γ 2
2(2− γ 2)
((M − c2(1− γ ))(1+ γ )+ γ θ)
which is always positive since M > c2 is necessary for the model to make sense.
17 Recalling that s is the policy instrument, the total effect of s on global emissions can be decomposed into
the effect at home and abroad, that is
de
ds
=
de1
ds
+
de2
ds
=
dc˜1
ds
[
γ
4− γ 2
− β
2− γ 2
4− γ 2
]
where c˜1 = c1 + βte . Since, obviously,
dc˜1
ds < 0, it is easy to see that the total effect is negative if and only if(
γ
4− γ 2
)
− β
(
2− γ 2
4− γ 2
)
> 0
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2.3 Sequential Game Under a Carbon Tax331
We analyze, for the sake of completeness, a sequential game under a carbon tax, where the332
foreign firm is a Stackelberg leader, in order to perform a robustness check. The best reply333
for the home firm is p1(p2, t) = (M + c1 + t)/2+ (γ /2)p2 where t is the carbon tax. The334
maximization program for the Stackelberg leader firm 2 is then:335
max
p2
(p2 − c2) (M + γ p1(p2, t)− p2)336
with solution pseq2,t =
M(2+ γ )+ c2(2− γ 2)+ γ (t + c1)
4− 2γ 2
. After computing the value of337
p1 one can obtain the equilibrium quantities18 for a generic tax t and then solve for the338
equivalent tax namely for t˜ ≡ teβ, such that qseq1,t˜ = θ . This value is found to be339
t˜ = ξ
[(
4γ 2 − 8
)
θ + M(4+ 2γ − γ 2)+
(
2− γ 2
)
γ c2
]
− c1340
where ξ = (4− 3γ 2)−1.341
The final prices under the equivalent tax are342
pseq1,t˜ = ξ
[
M(4+ 2γ − γ 2)− (4− γ 2)θ +
(
2− γ 2
)
γ c2
]
343
pseq2,t˜ = ξ
[
M(2+ 2γ )+ (2− γ 2)c2 − 2θγ
]
.344
345
The corresponding quantities are:346
qseq1,t˜ = θ347
qseq2,t˜ = ξ
(
2− γ 2
) (
M − c2 + Mγ − θγ + γ 2c2
)
348
349
The comparison of the foreign firm production under a sequential game carbon tax scenario350
and the quantity under an emission standard shows that, again, the carbon leak is higher under351
a carbon tax, confirming the results obtained with different game structures.352
Indeed qseq2,s = (1/2)
(
M(1+ γ )− c2(1− γ 2)− γ θ
)
and353
qseq2,t˜ − q
seq
2,s = (η/2)γ
2 (M(1+ γ )− c2(1− γ 2)− θγ ) .354
This difference is positive for γ ∈ [0, 1). This robustness check clearly shows that the355
standard leads the unregulated firm 2 to set a higher price than under the equivalent carbon356
tax; this less aggressive behavior is induced by the quantity cap on the domestic output under357
the emission standard. Indeed a comparison reveals that the difference between the prices in358
a sequential game under a standard, computed in 2.2.1, and the prices under the sequential359
tax game are both positive19, namely pseqi,s − p
seq
i,t˜ > 0 for i = 1, 2. This difference confirms360
the intuition discussed in the Introduction that the standard restricts the home firm’s best361
reply more than a tax, even when firm 2 retains its ability to manipulate the rival’s price.362
2.4 The Simultaneous Game Under a Standard363
Suppose that firm 1 acts in the expectation that firm 2 will use its best reply, then firm 1 will364
choose the price p1 solving p1 = M+γ p2−θ while at the same time p2 = (M+γ p1+c2)/2.365
18 One has qseq2,t =
M(2+γ )−c2(2−γ 2)+γ (c1+t)
4 and q
seq
1,t =
M(4+2γ−γ 2)−(4−3γ 2)(t+c1)+γ c2(2−γ 2)
4(2−γ 2) .
19 Indeed, pseq1,s − p
seq
1,t˜ is equal to (h/v)γ
3 and pseq2,s − p
seq
2,t˜ is equal to (h/v)γ
2 where h =(
M + γ (M − θ)− c2(1− γ 2)
)
and v = (1− γ 2)(4− 3γ 2) are both positive for γ in [0, 1).
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These two equations uniquely define the pair (psim1,s , p
sim
2,s ) satisfying the constraint and lying366
on the best reply function of firm 2. Since the solution obtained under a tax scheme in Sect.367
2.2.2 also lies on the best reply of firm2, itmust be that the unique tax tˆ that achieves a demand368
to firm 1 equal to θ must lead to prices equal to (psim1,tˆ , p
sim
2,tˆ ) = (p
sim
1,s , p
sim
2,s ) as can be easily369
verified by computation. It follows that psim1,s =
[
M(2+ γ )+ γ c2 − 2θ
]
(2 − γ 2)−1 and370
psim2,s =
[
M(1+ γ )+ c2 − γ θ
]
(2 − γ 2)−1 (with pe1 > pe2). The corresponding quantities371
are qsim1,s = θ and q
sim
2,s =
M(1+ γ )− c2(1− γ 2)− γ θ
2− γ 2
= qsim2,tˆ .372
The emissions by the foreign firm (and hence the carbon leak) are the same under a tax373
as under a standard if prices are set simultaneously with firm 2 using its best reply function374
and firm 2 setting a price equal to the price that respects the constraint.375
As discussed above, this solution is only apparently stable, because a deviation [in partic-376
ular the “best deviation”] by firm 2 must lead to a change in the price by firm 1 in order to377
respect the constraint. The best deviation for firm 2 is to the price computed as a solution of378
the Stackelberg game given above, with pseq2,s =
[
M(1+ γ )+ c2(1− γ 2)− γ θ
]
/(2−2γ 2).379
If firm 1 sticks to psim1,s then q1(p
sim
1,s , p
seq
2,s ) exceeds θ as it can be easily verified.20 Hence380
the price psim2,s is not admissible once firm 2 chooses p
seq
2,s (it does not belong to P(pseq2,s )). In381
this sense the solution with simultaneous moves is upset by such a deviation by firm 2.382
Under price competitionwith differentiated products, for any sequenceofmoves, prices are383
strategic complements, and the marginal benefit of a price increase for firm i is an increasing384
function of the rival’s price. An increase in one’s own price reduces one’s own demand, but385
this negative effect is dampened because the rival also increases its price along its best reply386
function. The steeper the rival’s best reply the stronger is this dampening effect. Hence, the387
steeper the rival’s best reply the higher the marginal benefit of a price increase. Assume now388
to start an unregulated market. Then the equilibrium prices are determined in a simultaneous389
Bertrand game. The effect of a tax that leads to the desired level of emissions at home is390
to shift the best reply of the taxed firm (parallel to the original one) so as to increase both391
firms’ prices. This new equilibrium has firm 1 producing the quantity that must be consistent392
with the Government fixed emission target. Under an emission standard for the same target,393
if firms play simultaneously the best reply of firm 2 is untouched while that of firm 1 is not394
the same as under a tax, but is as represented in our Fig. 1 and displays a higher slope in395
the relevant range. However, the tax was set so as to respect the constraint and therefore the396
equilibrium price pair was represented by a point lying on firm 1 constraint: the equilibrium397
is therefore unchanged and the two policies produce the same prices-quantities. Under a398
standard and sequential play with 2 as a leader, the equilibrium prices are moved in the399
upward direction by the ability of firm 2 to choose a price that maximizes its own profit400
along the constraint for firm 1 and away from firm 2 best reply function. As prices go up the401
quantity of firm 1 is fixed (since it is given by the constraint or by the equivalent tax) and402
that of firm 2 decreases. Finally, price leadership by firm 2 under a tax leads to higher prices403
than a tax with simultaneous play, but still lower than under a standard and price leadership;404
consider that an equivalent tax for this case is not the same as for the case with simultaneous405
play since the equilibrium prices are determined by different formulas. Therefore, the two406
different taxes produce different amounts of leakage.407
20 Indeed q1(psim1,s , p
seq
2,s ) =
(
4θ+Mγ 3+Mγ 4−6θγ 2+θγ 4−γ 3c2+γ 5c2
)
2
(
γ 4−3γ 2+2
) , while q1(psim1,s , pseq2,s ) − θ =
γ 3
2
M + γ (M − θ)− c2(1− γ 2)
γ 4 − 3γ 2 + 2
a positive quantity as far as c2 < M , a necessary condition for firm 2
being able to produce.
123
Journal: 10640-EARE Article No.: 0234 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2018/3/6 Pages: 24 Layout: Small
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
un
co
rr
ec
te
d p
ro
of
P. G. Garella, M. T. Trentinaglia
In “Appendix I”, we provide a table summarizing and comparing the resulting quantities408
and prices of all the different scenarios analyzed and discussed above.409
3 The Price Discrimination Model410
In this section, we assume again that there are two firms located in two different countries,411
the home and the foreign one respectively, and each firm can supply its product in both412
countries.21 Firms can now price discriminate across countries. Firm 1 quotes price ph1 for413
sales at home and p f1 for its exports to country F (similarly, firm 2 quotes price p f2 for sales414
in country F and ph2 for its exports to H). Demand functions in the two countries are given415
by (1) and (2). Production and transport costs are assumed to be equal to zero, to simplify.22416
When there are no emission restrictions in country H, the two firms engage in price417
competition and the resulting equilibrium is symmetric. Prices are pbhi = A/(2 − γ ) and418
pb fi = B/(2− γ ) and equilibrium demands are q
bh
i = A/(2− γ ) and q
b f
i = B/(2− γ ) for419
i = 1, 2, where the superscript b refers to the baseline setting.420
3.1 Emission Standards Versus Carbon Tax421
We now assume that an emission standard is introduced in country H: as a consequence, total422
emissions by firm 1 in the regulated country cannot exceed s. Here, given the solution to the423
unconstrained competition game, the restriction on emissions s bites only if β(A + B)/(2−424
γ ) > s, or425
θ¯ ≡ (A + B)/(2− γ ) > θ. (11)426
In a general form, the binding constraint for firm 1 is qsh1 + q
s f
1 < θ , where superscript s427
distinguishes the emission standard setting. The constraint can be written as A+ B+γ (ph2 +428
p f2 ) − p
h
1 − p
f
1 = θ if it binds, so that it is apparent that it does not define the two prices429
set by firm 1 even if the prices by the foreign firm, p f2 and p
h
2 are given. This implies that430
Stackelberg leadership by firm 2 determines the position of the constraint but that firm 1 has431
some leeway in adjusting the prices domestically and abroad so as to maximize its profits432
along the constraint. The Lagrangian for firm 1 is433
L
(
ph1 , p
f
2 , λ
)
=
(
A − ph1 + γ p
h
2
)
ph1 +
(
B − p f1 + γ p
f
2
)
p f1434
+ λ
(
A + B − θ + γ (ph2 + p
f
2 )− p
h
1 − p
f
1
)
(12)435
21 Production only takes place in country H for firm 1 and in country F for firm 2.
22 This framework could be also extended to analyze a 3-firm setting, with two symmetric firms located in the
regulated country and one firm located in the unregulated country. The demand functions individually faced
by each firm in the domestic country H are
qh1 = A + γ p3 + βp2 − p1 q
h
2 = A + γ p3 + βp1 − p2 q
h
1 = A + γ (p1 + p2)− p3
Since firms 1 and 2, in the home country, are perfectly symmetric, they will be allowed to produce up to 50%
of total emissions each. Since there is no trade in emission permits, the two firms will be charging exactly the
same price, and the conclusions in terms of leakage and trade balance will be similar to those of the 2-by-2
setting.
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The “Stackelberg follower” prices for firm 1 are436
psh1 =
3A + B − 2θ
4
+
1
4
γ p f2 +
3
4
γ ph2437
ps f1 =
3B + A − 2θ
4
+
3
4
γ p f2 +
1
4
γ ph2 (13)438
439
Firm 2, acting as a Stackelberg leader, sets prices to maximize its profits, aware that firm 1440
will abide the emission constraint. Its maximization program is441
max
ph2 ,p
f
2
(
A + γ psh1 − p
h
2
)
ph2 +
(
B + γ ps f1 − p
f
2
)
p f2 (14)442
where psh1 and p
s f
1 are as in (13). As a result,23 in equilibrium, total emissions in country H443
are βθ and in country F are equal to output produced by firm 2, that is:444
es2 = q
s
2 = (1/2)
[
(A + B) (1+ γ )− θγ
]
. (15)445
In accordancewith the analysis in the baselinemodel,we need to determine the carbon leak446
when firm 1 is subject to either an emission standard or a carbon tax. After the introduction of447
a carbon tax te on firm1,we solve for theNash equilibriumprices,24 and find total equilibrium448
emissions as a function of t = teβ:25449
βq t1 = β
(A + B) (2+ γ )− 2t
(
2− γ 2
)
4− γ 2
and q t2 =
(A + B) (2+ γ )+ 2tγ
4− γ 2
. (16)450
We assume that the government in country H introduces a tax t such that total emissions451
by firm 1 will reach the desired level, that is q t1 = θ—this desired tax level, t¯ , is the solution452
to 2(2− γ 2)t¯ = (2+ γ )(A + B − θ(2− γ )).453
Hence, total emissions with t = t¯ (and hence, te = t¯/β) are:454
βq t1 + q
t
2 = βθ + ((A + B) (1+ γ )− θγ ) /(2− γ
2), (17)455
where subscript t denotes the carbon tax scenario.456
3.2 Carbon Leak and Global Emissions457
It is now possible to compare the levels of carbon leak, as previously defined, to assess458
the change in emissions by firm 2 under the two alternative scenarios.26 Since obviously459
q1(t) = q1(s), the difference in global emissions under the two policies is:460
q t2 − q
s
2 = (γ /2) ((A + B) (1+ γ )− θγ ) /
(
4− 2γ 2
)
. (18)461
23 See “Appendix II” for the formal derivation.
24 With firm 1 problem defined by:
max
ph1 ,p
f
1
=
(
ph1 − t
)
qh1
(
ph1 , p
h
2
)
+
(
p f1 − t
)
q f1
(
p f1 , p
f
2
)
.
25 See “Appendix II” for further details.
26 By definition, the change in emission by firm 1 is 0.
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Also, the differences in production with respect to the baseline model by firm 2 under a tax462
and under a standard are463
q2(s) = γ
(A + B)(1− γ )− θ(2− γ )
2(2− γ )
(19)464
q2(t) = γ
(A + B − θ(2− γ ))
(2− γ )(2− γ 2)
. (20)465
466
Letting σ = 1− θ/θ¯ , the numerator in (19) is positive if σ > γ , while the numerator in467
(20) is positive as far as σ > 0. Hence an equivalent carbon tax always leads to leakages,468
while an emission standard can lead to a reduction in emissions abroad, in particular if469
goods exhibit a degree of substitutability not lower than the percentage required reduction470
in emissions—this looks as a very mild condition indeed, if one considers realistic orders of471
magnitude for admissible percentage reductions.472
Proposition 2 When international price discrimination is allowed, the carbon leak under a473
tax policy is larger than under an emission standard. The difference between the two policies474
increases with the degree of substitution between the foreign and domestic goods. In fact, if475
product differentiation is high, an emission standard may give rise to a negative leakage (a476
reduction in emissions in country F).477
This result confirms the comparison obtained when price discrimination is not allowed.478
Consider now the change in global emissions: under a standard policy, the change is479
negative if q2(s)+ βq1 < 0, where q2(s) is given by (19) and where q1 is the same480
under the two policies, namely equal to β (θ − (A + B)/(2− γ )).27 One can easily show481
that a standard never induces higher global emissions.482
Under a tax policy, by contrast, one has that the global change in emissions is negative if483
q2(t)+ βq1 < 0 whereq2(t) is given by (20). The expression for the change in global484
emissions then becomes485
q(t) = γ
A + B − θ(2− γ )
(2− γ )(2− γ 2)
+ β
(
θ −
A + B
2− γ
)
,486
or, letting ω−1 = (2− γ )(2− γ 2), one has487
q(t) = ω
[
A + B − θ(2− γ )
] (
βγ 2 + γ − 2β
)
488
Since ω is positive and since the term (A + B) − θ(2 − γ ) is positive for the admissible489
levels of θ , one has that a global reduction can be obtained only if γ < β(2 − γ 2). This490
last inequality can be violated for low values of β and high values of γ . Hence, under these491
conditions, a carbon tax can induce higher global emissions.492
Remark 2 If international price discrimination is allowed, an emission standard policy never493
leads to higher global emissions. An equivalent carbon tax leads to an increase in global494
emissions if the degree of product substitutability is high and the emission rate of the home495
firm is low enough, with the exact region given by the pairs (γ, β) lying below the curve496
β = γ /(1− γ 2).497
27 Since after some manipulations this inequality can be written as
(A + B)
(
2β − γ + γ 2
)
> θ
(
4β − 2γ + γ 2 − 2βγ
)
,
one only has to check whether this inequality could be violated for θ = θ¯ [see Eq. (11)]. The inequality then
is reduced to γ 2(2− γ ) > 0, which holds true as far as γ > 0.
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This qualifies the validity of the result obtained in Sect. 2. The results for carbon leak and498
for global emissions hinge upon the underlying price adjustments: under either policy, both499
the domestic and the foreign firm prices increase; however, the price increase under a standard500
is higher than under a tax, with the corresponding decrease in the quantities produced and in501
particular by firm 2, reducing the leakage.502
3.3 Trade Balance503
In this section, we quantify the trade gains/losses following the unilateral implementation504
of the environmental policy in country H. We define the trade balance of country H as the505
difference in imported and exported quantities, that is T B Q H = qh2 − q f1 .28 To simplify, we506
assume that the two markets have equal size, that is A = B = Z ; here the maximum value507
for θ becomes θ¯ = 2Z/(2− γ ). The trade balance of the baseline setting is exactly equal to508
0 under these parameter restrictions.509
In the regulated country, the trade balance under a tax or an emission standard are, respec-510
tively, given by511
T B Qt = (1+ γ ) ((2− γ )θ − 2Z)
2(2− γ 2)
512
T B Qs = (1/4)((2+ γ )θ − 2(1+ γ )Z) (21)513514
Since T B Qt is negative for θ < θ¯ , it is apparent that in the case of a carbon tax, the515
implementationof a unilateral environmental policyworsens the tradebalanceof the regulated516
country which becomes a net-importer for any value of γ .517
In the case of a standard policy instead, the regulated country can become a net exporter,518
according to the value taken by θ : if this is close enough to the maximum, θ¯ , the country519
becomes a net exporter. The exact range of values for θ for which this is the case is 2Z(1+520
γ )/(2 + γ ) < θ < θ¯ or θ in (θ˜ (γ ), θ¯ (γ )), where both the lower and upper bounds of the521
interval are increasing functions of γ . The gap θ¯ (γ )− θ˜ (γ ) widens as γ increases, namely522
as substitutability increases. In practical terms, even an important percentage reduction in523
emissions can be achieved while leading to an improvement in the trade balance in volumes,524
providedγ is high enough—think of industries like cement, or steel. For instance, a simulation525
shows thatγ equal to 0.5 allows a percentage reduction of slightlymore than 10% in emissions526
while guaranteeing an improvement in the trade balance.527
Then, we take it that the effect of a tax on the trade balance is negative and that of a528
standard is positive—and, as it can be easily seen, in the extreme range of policies for which529
it is negative, less detrimental than that of a tax.29 The results can be summarized as follows.530
Proposition 3 For any level of γ in (0,1), the trade balance of the regulated country worsens531
if a carbon tax is implemented. The trade balance under a carbon tax is always worse than532
under a standard.533
28 In “Appendix III”, we also assess the impact of these unilateral policies on the net trade balance defined in
terms of values.
29 Recalling that T B Qt < 0, ∀γ ∈ (0, 1), the difference between the trade balance under the two different
scenarios is
T B Qs − T B Qt = γ
2
4(2− γ 2)
(2Z(1+ γ )− θγ )
which is positive for γ < 1.
123
Journal: 10640-EARE Article No.: 0234 TYPESET DISK LE CP Disp.:2018/3/6 Pages: 24 Layout: Small
A
u
th
o
r
 P
r
o
o
f
un
co
rr
ec
te
d p
ro
of
P. G. Garella, M. T. Trentinaglia
The following Remark investigates the impact of an emission standard policy on the trade534
balance.535
Remark 3 A standard can improve or deteriorate the trade balance: an improvement is more536
easily achieved the higher the degree of substitutability and the lower the target reduction in537
emissions.538
4 Conclusions539
This paper contributes to the existing literature on anti-pollution policies by comparing the540
effects, in terms of carbon leakages and trade flows, of two alternative policy instruments541
that can be unilaterally implemented by an industrialized country, namely a carbon tax and542
an emission standard policy. Carbon leakages (and job leakages) are an argument against543
environmental policies in the U.S. and other industrialized countries where some sectors544
are heavily exposed to competition from less developed countries. In general, leakages are a545
serious issue in evaluating the real effectiveness of anti-pollution policies at a global scale (e.g.546
Morgenstern 2009). They are also relevant at a national level when regulation is incomplete.547
We analyze an international duopoly with price competition and differentiated products.548
We do not consider relocation of plants (which are medium or long-term decisions), but only549
production changes and the implied emissions. A carbon tax leads, as expected, to carbon550
leakages; furthermore, the carbon leak may be so large as to increase global emissions.551
An emission standard policy leads to a leak only under extreme conditions, namely for552
unlikely large targeted reductions, otherwise it causes a reduction of emissions abroad as553
well as at home. Interestingly, the home country then functions as a global regulator in554
this case. Of course we do not want to stress this particular result as it may be due to the555
specificity of our model, while the more general argument we propose is that emission556
standards are more effective than taxes in the presence of incomplete regulation and of557
oligopolistic price competition. The different effects of the two policies arise because, under558
an emission standard, the firm in the unregulated country can expect the regulated firm to559
abide to the regulation and therefore to abandon its unconstrained best reply function and560
raise prices in order to curtail production (and therefore emissions). This amounts to let the561
unregulated firm act as a Stackelberg leader in a two stage game. Under a tax, instead, firms562
behave as Bertrand competitors in the usual sense; the regulated firm, then, is only penalized563
as having a higher cost than without a tax.564
We have considered two different scenarios: in the baseline one, firms are not discrimi-565
nating between the two countries, and they charge the same price in the home and foreign566
country. In a more generalized version, we let instead both firms discriminate by charging567
two different prices. We measure the carbon leakage by the increase in production abroad—568
which brings along an increase in emissions abroad hampering the global effectiveness of569
the antipollution policy. In either case, we observe that a greater carbon leakage occurs under570
a carbon tax. Under price discrimination, an increase in global emissions after a carbon tax571
cannot be ruled out (a result also obtained in Feddersen 2012). This, however, never occurs572
under an emission standard policy. In this sense, perverse results of environmental policies573
seem to be by far less likely under an emission standard than under a tax.574
As to the effects on trade balance, in the two country framework, the carbon tax worsens575
the trade balance in volumes of the regulated country, while the standard policy leads to an576
improvement if the degree of substitution between the two goods is high enough (otherwise577
it leads to a worsening). Furthermore, a standard policy is always leading to better trade578
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balance in volumes for the home country than an equivalent tax. If volumes are related to579
jobs in the regulated industry, then of course a standard may be preferred also considering580
the impact on employment levels.581
Our analysis is cast in a partial equilibrium framework and as such it cannot fully incor-582
porate all the effects of policy changes. For instance, in a multi-sector economy, a carbon583
tax may alter the equilibrium prices of the factors most used in the production of the “dirty”584
goods; if these factor prices decrease there is a reduction in costs for other sectors, and also585
possibly for the competing foreign firm. However Fullerton and Heutel (2007) in a general586
equilibrium model argue that with a carbon tax, “as pollution becomes more costly, the dirty587
sector seeks to adjust its demand for all three inputs”, namely labor, capital, and emissions,588
but the changes are not as obvious as one may expect. In our model input price changes may589
alter the marginal costs. However, it is difficult to predict the final direction of change. A590
second issue is that of the so-called “second dividend” of a carbon tax. If revenues from a tax591
are used to reduce other distortionary taxes, like a tax on income, the final effect on welfare592
is increased Goulder (1995). However, we do not discuss welfare effects, but just effects593
on leakages and on the trade balance. The preference for a tax over an emission standard594
in terms of welfare may be clearly affected by the existence of a double dividend. Even in595
our analysis, if the Government can use the tax receipts to cut other pre-existing taxes on596
non-dirty inputs used by the domestic firm, or on its sales income, the final resulting negative597
effects of the tax on trade and on leakages may change.598
Appendices599
I: Summary of Results600
Table 1 summarizes themain results obtained throughout ourmain analysis and extensions.30601
The comparison of the different equilibria reveals that602
qsim1,s = q
seq
1,s = q
sim
1,tˆ = q
seq
1,t˜ = θ603
qsim2,tˆ = q
sim
2,s > q
seq
2,t˜ > q
seq
2,s604605
and that606
pseqi,s > p
seq
i,t˜ > p
sim
i,tˆ = p
sim
i,s607
for i = 1, 2.608
Table 1 Summary of results
Policy instrument Simultaneous game Sequential game
No regulation (qbi , p
b
i ) with i = 1, 2
Standards ((qsim1,s , q
sim
2,s ), (p
sim
1,s , p
sim
2,s )) ((q
seq
1,s , q
seq
2,s ), (p
seq
1,s , p
seq
2,s ))
Equivalent carbon tax ((qsim1,tˆ , q
sim
2,tˆ ), (p
sim
1,tˆ , p
sim
2,tˆ )) ((q
seq
1,t˜ , q
seq
2,t˜ ), (p
seq
1,t˜ , p
seq
2,t˜ ))
30 The results and their comparisons discussed below rely on the simplifying assumption that c1 = c2 = 0.
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II: Derivation of Equilibrium in the 2 × 2 Model609
Let us consider the emission standard policy first. The Lagreangean for firm 1 is610
L
(
ph1 , p
f
1 , λ
)
= qh1 p
h
1 + q
f
1 p
f
1 + λ
(
qh1 + q
f
1 − θ
)
611
and the best reply is:612
ph1
(
ph2 , p
f
2
)
=
1
4
(
3A + B − 2θ + γ p f2 + 3γ p
h
2
)
613
p f1
(
ph2 , p
f
2
)
=
1
4
(
A + 3B − 2θ + 3γ p f2 + γ p
h
2
)
614
615
Firm 2 then uses these best replies above to maximize616
π2 = qh2 p
h
2 + q
f
2 p
f
s617
= p f2
(
1
4
γ
(
A + 3B − 2θ + 3γ p f2 + γ p
h
2
)
+ B − p f2
)
618
+ ph2
(
1
4
γ
(
3A + B − 2θ + γ p f2 + 3γ p
h
2
)
+ A − ph2
)
.619
620
The equilibrium price set by firm 2 in country H is621
ph,s2 =
A
(
−2γ 3 − 3γ 2 + 3γ + 4
)
+ γ
(
B(γ + 1)+
(
γ 2 − 2
)
θ
)
4
(
γ 4 − 3γ 2 + 2
) ,622
623
while p f,s2 is obtained by interchanging A and B in the expression for p
h,s
2 . Finally, the624
equilibrium price of firm 1 in country H is given by625
ph,s1 =
A
(
3γ 4 − 4γ 3 − 13γ 2 + 6γ + 12
)
+ B
(
γ 4 − 3γ 2 + 2γ + 4
)
− 2
(
γ 2 − 2
)2
θ
8
(
γ 4 − 3γ 2 + 2
)626
627
while p f,s1 is obtained by interchanging A and B in the expression for p
h,s
1 .628
The demands faced by firms 1 and 2 in country H are, respectively,629
qsh1 =
(
4+ 2γ − γ 2
)
(A − B)+ 4
(
2− γ 2
)
θ
8
(
2− γ 2
)630
qsh2 =
A (4+ 3γ )+ γ (B − 2θ)
8
631
632
while q f,s1 and q
f,s
2 can be obtained by interchanging A and B in the expressions for q
h,s
1633
and qh,s2 respectively. From these, we retrieve the equilibrium total emissions634
βqs1 = βθ and q
s
2 = (1/2)
[
(A + B) (1+ γ )− θγ
]
.635
reported in (15). Whenever a carbon tax te on emissions is implemented, the equilibrium636
prices in the Home and Foreign country are given by637
phi (t) =
A(2+ γ )+ 2t
4− γ 2
p f2 (t) =
B(2+ γ + 2t)
4− γ 2
638
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for i = 1, 2, where t = teβ. The corresponding equilibrium quantities are639
qh1 (t) =
A(2+ γ )− t (2− γ 2)
4− γ 2
q f1 (t) =
B(2+ γ )− t (2− γ 2)
4− γ 2
640
qh2 (t) =
A(2+ γ )+ tγ
4− γ 2
q f2 (t) =
B(2+ γ )+ tγ
4− γ 2
641
After replacing the carbon tax t with the “equivalent” taxation level, t¯ = (2+ γ )(A + B −642
θ(2+γ ))/2(2−γ 2), and letting g−1 = (2−γ )(2−γ 2), the corresponding prices are given643
by the equations644
ph,t1 = g
(
A
(
3− γ 2
)
+ B − θ(2− γ )
)
645
ph,t2 =
g
2
A
(
4− 2γ 2 + γ
)
+ γ (B + (γ − 2)θ)646
647
while p f,t1 and p
f,t
2 are obtained by interchanging A and B in the expressions for p
h,t
1648
and ph,t2 respectively, and where the desired tax level, t˜ , is the solution to 2(2 − γ 2)t¯ =649
(2+ γ )(A + B − θ(2− γ )). The quantities when t = t¯ correspond to Eq. (17).650
III: Trade Balance in Values651
Since prices change, the comparison between instruments is tricky when considering trade652
balances in values. In national accounting, prices are held constant, and hence quantities are653
compared. However, for the sake of completeness, we also analyze the impact of the two654
different instruments on the trade balance in values. The trade balance for country H in values655
is given by656
T BV t = −
(
4− γ 2
)
θ2 + 4(1+ γ )2Z2 − 8(1+ γ )θ Z + 2γ 3θ Z
4(2− γ 2)2
657
T BV s = −
(
4− γ 2
)
θ2 + 4(1+ γ )2Z2 − 8(1+ γ )θ Z
16
(
1− γ 2
) .658
659
The numerator in the trade balance for a standard, T BV s , is decreasing in θ as far as660
θ < θ¯ = 2Z/(2 − γ ), therefore one has a sufficient condition for trade balance in value661
under a standard to be negative by verifying that for θ¯ the numerator is positive, which turns662
out to be true for all values of γ . Similarly, for T BV t , the same properties apply.663
Accordingly, in either case the regulated country experiences a trade deficit in terms of664
values, resulting in a worsening with respect to the unregulated situation. To understand665
which of the two policies is less detrimental to the trade balance in values, one can take the666
difference between the absolute values of T BV t and T BV s .667
∣∣T Bt ∣∣− ∣∣T Bs ∣∣ = γ 3
(
γ
(
γ 2 − 4
)
θ2 − 4(γ 2 + γ )2Z2 + 8(γ + 1)θ Z
)
−16
(
2− γ 2
)2 (1− γ 2) (22)668
The numerator in (22) is increasing and concave in θ , and therefore in the targeted emission669
amount s, where s = βθ . However, for γ = 0 the expression is zero and there is obviously670
no difference between the effects of the two policies; for γ > 0, the numerator is positive671
as far as s lies in the interval (s(γ ), s¯), where s(γ ) = β
[
γ (1+γ )
4−γ 2 2Z
]
and s¯ ≡ βθ¯ =672
β[2Z/(2 − γ )], which corresponds to no reduction in emissions, namely θ equal to the673
unregulated equilibrium output for the home firm. Hence, for s(γ ) < s < s¯, the desired674
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Fig. 2 Percentage reduction
level of emissions, s, implies a deficit under a tax exceeding that under a standard—while675
for 0 < s < s(γ ) the reverse relation obtains.676
Considering reductions in percentage over the pre-policy emissions level, namely σ ≡677
(s¯ − s)/s¯, where 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, the tax policy results in worse deficits as far as σ is lower than678
σ(γ ) ≡ 1− γ (1+γ )2+γ and in better deficits if σ > σ(γ ). Since the function σ(γ ) is monotone679
with ∂σ/∂γ < 0, since σ(0) = 1 and σ(1) = 1/3, requiring percentage reductions up to 30%680
of pre-policy emissions is sufficient to have a worse trade balance in values under a tax than681
under an equivalent emission standard. The result can be reversed for high reduction rates682
and high substitutability parameter; for instance, for a substitutability parameter γ = 0.9,683
a tax is better than a standard in terms of trade in values only in the required reduction in684
percentage is above 41% of the initial emissions. To be precise, the percentage reduction that685
reverses the result is given as a percentage above the function σ(γ ) in Fig. 2.686
Proposition 4 Considering the trade balance in values, a reduction in emissions leads to a687
trade deficit for the home country; For a given targeted reduction in emissions of the home688
firm, this deficit in values is worse under a tax than under an emission standard policy, as689
far as the targeted emissions by the home firm after the policy is above 70% of the pre-policy690
level. For lower final emission targets, the trade deficit under a tax can be lower than under691
a standard policy only if the goods are highly substitutable.692
Hence, the different results with either trade volumes, discussed in Sect. 3.3, and trade693
values are due to the fact that the volume effects dominates under a carbon tax policy.694
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